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STATE REGULATION OF UNPROTECTED UNION ACTIVITY:
BYPASSING THE "ARGUABLY SUBJECT" TEST WITH
NLRB ADVISORY OPINIONS
RECENT Supreme Court decisions defining the extent to which state regula-
tion of labor relations has been preempted by federal legislation seem to have
neutralized the broad principle, enunciated twelve years ago in the Briggs-
Stratton decision,' that the states may regulate union conduct which is neither
protected by section 7 nor prohibited by section 8 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.2 Section 7 grants employees the right to form labor organizations
and to act in concert for the purpose of collective bargaining; the act protects
the free exercise of these rights by prohibiting employer reprisals against em-
ployees engaged in the protected activities. 3 It is now well settled that, absent
violence or other dangers peculiarly the concern of the states' police power,
states cannot regulate union activity protected by section 7.4 Similarly immune
from state regulation are activities prohibited under the unfair labor practice
provisions of section 8.5 Some forms of concerted union activity, while not
prohibited by federal law, are of such questionable status as weapons in labor
management disputes that they fall outside the protection of section 7, and
may therefore be subject to reprisals by management. These include, for ex-
ample, partial strikes such as the slowdown 6 or the intermittent work stop-
page.7 It is in this area of union activity that the states' power to regulate,
at one time upheld by the Supreme Court, has been made unclear.
In Briggs-Stratton, the Supreme Court expressly permitted Wisconsin to out-
law a partial strike which was held to be neither protected nor prohibited by
the federal act." A union attempting to bring pressure to bear on an employer
during contract negotiations engaged in a series of intermittent work stop-
1. International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245
(1949).
2. 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1958).
3. Section 8(a) (1), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958).
4. International Union, UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950) ; Hill v. Florida ex rel.
Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
5. E.g., Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
6. E.g., Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360, 367-68 (1952) ; Elk
Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950); see International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Bd. (Stolper Steel), 258 Wis. 481, 46 N.W.2d 185 (1951).
7. E.g., International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. [Briggs-
Stratton], 336 U.S. 245 (1949) ; Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589, 1592-95
(1954); Kohler Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 207, 218-21 (1954); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 1547 (1954).
8. International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245
(1949).
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pages. The employer secured an order from the state labor board directing
the union to cease and desist from using such tactics, and the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin affirmed. 9 The United States Supreme Court upheld the issu-
ance of the order, rejecting the union's claim that Wisconsin's Employment
Peace Act-the authority for the state board's action- was preempted by
federal labor legislation. 10 Although violence was involved in the dispute and
was enjoined by the state board's order,'1 the Supreme Court's holding
was not based on the states' recognized power to regulate instances of vio-
lence.1 2 As the Court itself noted, the union had not appealed the portion of
the order prohibiting violence ;13 thus the sole question presented was whether
the state could regulate the nonviolent concerted activities involved. The Court
stated that federal legislation does not withdraw state police powers over such
activities unless Congress clearly manifests an intent to preempt the field;
moreover it seemed to indicate that exclusion of the states from this area
might be affected only by affirmative federal regulation.14 The Court then
found that the partial strike in question was neither a protected activity
under section 7 nor an unfair labor practice outlawed by section S. Thus,
because such conduct must be "governable by the state or it is entirely un-
governed,"'u the Court found the Wisconsin Board's order to be a valid
exercise of state regulatory power.
In Garner v. Teamsters Union,16 however, the Court seemed to disallow
the state regulatory power approved in Briggs-Stratton. The Pennsylvania
court of first instance had enjoined a union's peaceful picketing; it had found
that the union's purpose was to coerce an employer into compelling his em-
ployees to join the union, an unfair labor practice under Pennsylvania law. 1 7
On appeal, however, the state supreme court found that the activity fell with-
in the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.' 8 The Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed this finding of preemption. The Court stated that the
picketing in question would have been subject to section 8(b) (2) of the
federal act,' 9 the operative provision of which is almost identical to the Penn-
9. International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 250 Wis. 550,
27 N.W.2d 875 (1947).
10. 336 U.S. 245, 264-65 (1949).
11. 250 Wis. at 569a, 27 N.W.2d at 884.
12. E.g., Allen-Bradley Local 1111, UEW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
237 Wis. 164, 295 N.W. 791 (1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 740 (1942). For the most recent dis-
cussion of the violence exception, see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 247-48 (1959).
13. 336 U.S. at 250 n.8.
14. Id. at 253.
15. Id. at 254.
16. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
17. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 62 Dauphin County Rep. 339 (Pa. C.P. 1951).
18. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893 (1953).
19, 61 Stat. 141 (1947),29U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1958).
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sylvania statute involved.20 If, as the Court seemed to believe,21 the picketing
was prohibited by section 8, its holding of preemption would not necessarily
have been in conflict with the Briggs-Stratton decision. Activities prohibited
by the federal statute are regulated by the NLRB, and the bar against con-
current state regulation of such activities flows from the desire to avoid
regulation by "a multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures."
By definition, the "neither protected nor prohibited" activities in Briggs-
Stratton were outside the jurisdiction of the NLRB, and thus did not create
the danger of conflicting state and federal regulation feared by Garner. In-
deed, the Garner Court at one point seemed to approve Briggs-Stratton,
commenting that "injurious conduct which the National Labor Relations
Board is without express power to prevent" is regulable by the states.23
Later in the opinion, however, the Court suggested that Taft-Hartley might
preclude all state regulation, appearing to conclude that federal preemption
did not demand the express congressional mandate which the earlier de-
cision had required. Here the Court reasoned that, by outlawing certain
types of picketing, Taft-Hartley impliedly left all others, whether protected
or unprotected, free of any "methods and sources of restraint," and that
any state regulation would therefore impinge on this implicit federal policy.2 4
The authority of Briggs-Stratton is further questioned by the opinion in
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garnon,25 which expanded the primary
jurisdiction notions touched on in Garner. The earlier case had stated that,
due to the danger of conflicting remedies, states could not regulate any activ-
ity subject to regulation by the Board. Garmon went further to hold that
states could not act in any case involving activity "arguably subject" to sec-
tions 7 or 8, since, to take jurisdiction, the state tribunal would first have to
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6(c) (1952), the relevant state provision, is almost
the same as Labor Management Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (3) (1958), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by dis-
crimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em-
ployment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.. . ." Section
8(b) (2), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1958), the federal provision involved
in Garner, makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to discriminate against an employee
through the medium of the employer-by coercing the employer to commit an 8(a) (3)
unfair labor practice against the employee.
21. The Court, while apparently unwilling to state that the picketing involved con-
stituted an unfair labor practice, said, "Congress has taken in hand this particular type
of controversy where it affects interstate commerce." 346 U.S. at 488.
22. Id. at 490-91.
23. Id. at 488.
24. For the policy of the national Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn
all picketing but only that ascertained by its prescribed processess to fall within its
prohibitions. . . . For a State to impinge on the area of labor combat designed
to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to
declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits.
Id. at 499-500.
25. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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interpret those sections in order to find whether or not the activity actually
was subject to federal regulation.26 The Court reasoned that the regulatory
scheme established by Congress dictates that only the NLRB can make the
initial determination whether activity is governed by section 7 or 8.27 Since
the Briggs-Stratton Court itself undertook to decide whether the activity
before it was protected or prohibited by the federal act, the Garmon opinion
criticized Briggs-Stratton's approach and found it "no longer of general
application. '28 On the basis of this criticism, the majority opinion disa-
vowed the entire holding in Briggs-Stratton, including the holding that states
can regulate activities "neither protected nor prohibited" by federal law.
This issue, the majority implied, remains an open question.29
Expanding the justified criticism of Briggs-Stratton's approach into a
criticism of its broader holding, however, seems unwarranted. The Court
in Briggs-Stratton was unqualified to decide whether the partial strike was
protected or prohibited because that decision involved interpretations of
sections 7 and 8 which must be made in the first instance by the NLRB.
But, given a decision that the activity was neither protected nor prohibited,
the Court was not unqualified to decide whether such conduct should be
regulated by the states.30 This decision involves not only an analysis of the
broad purposes of the federal act, but also a consideration of the corresponding
interests of the states, and a determination of the means by which both the
state and the federal interests can best be accommodated. These problems of
federal-state relations are matters for judicial rather than administrative
"expertise." 3' Thus the criticisms advanced by the majority in Garmon should
not seriously disturb the reasons supporting the broad holding in Briggs-
Stratton.
Notwithstanding Garnon, the Garner decision remains as a possible repudi-
ation of Briggs-Stratton. The language in Garner which casts doubt on
Briggs-Stratton assumes that Congress, in passing section 8(b), intended that
only those activities specifically forbidden should be subject to any govern-
mental control.32 In support of this position, it might be argued that, because
Taft-Hartley was designed to equalize the relative positions of labor and
management, 33 Congress intended to preclude state regulation in order to
prevent disruption of the federally-created equilibrium.' 4 Before the enact-
26. Id. at 245.
27. Id. at 244-45.
28. Id. at 245 n.4.
29. Id. at 245 & n.4.
30. The concurring opinion in Garmon makes this point. Id. at 253 n.5 (Harlan, J.).
31. Indeed, the majority opinion seems to accept this distinction. See id. at 241-42.
32. See note 24 supra; Gregory, Federal or State Control of Concerted Union Activi-
ties, 46 VA. L. REv. 539, 544-45 (1960).
33. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 44 (1947).
34. See, e.g., Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over
Labor Relations: I, 59 COLUm. L. Rtv. 6, 20 (1959).
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ment of Taft-Hartley, however, states had regulated unprotected activity.35
In light of this existing pattern of regulation, of which the Taft-Hartley Con-
gress took notice, it is not likely that Congress would have attempted to
wipe the slate clean without explicitly saying so. On the contrary, Congress-
man Hartley indicated that the bill's sponsors were aware of the need to
preserve state regulatory legislation.36 If Congress did take account of exist-
ing state regulation in striking the balance, the Garner interpretation might
disrupt rather than protect the equilibrium which Taft-Hartley sought to
create. Moreover, since unprotected activities could be regulated by the
states before the passage of section 8(b), the Garner interpretation would
stake out a new area in which unions would be free to employ self-help, un-
fettered by any governmental control. It seems difficult to attribute any such
intent to the 80th Congress. Section l(b) of Taft-Hartley reflects a clear
policy to place labor-management relations under a rule of law,3 7 and thus
represents a shift from the laissez-faire approach of the Wagner Act.38
Furthermore, one purpose of the 1947 act was the withdrawal of economic
weapons from unions,30 an incongruous background for legislation which ex-
35. See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1297, 1307-
08 (1954) ; Gregory, supra note 32, at 541. Indeed, as Briggs-Stratton demonstrates, state
regulation was thought to continue. See notes 8-15 supra and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., the following colloquy between Representative Kersten of Wisconsin and
Mr. Hartley, House sponsor of the proposed legislation:
MR. KERSTEN: . . . Wisconsin and other States have their own labor relations laws.
We are very anxious that disputes be settled at the State level in so far as it is
possible. Can the gentleman give us assurance on that proposition ... that that
is the sense of the language and of the report?
MR. HARTLEY: That is the sense of the language of the bill and of the report. That
is my interpretation of the bill, that this will not interfere with the State of Wiscon-
sin in the administration of its own laws. In other words, this will not interfere
with the validity of the laws within that state.
MR. KERSTEN: And it will permit as many of these disputes to be settled at the
State level as possible?
MR. HARTLEY: Exactly.
93 CONG. REc. 6383-84 (1947.)
37. It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their
relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for pre-
venting the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect
the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose
activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor
and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare,
and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting
commerce....
61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1958).
38. See Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 322-23
(1951).
39. Section 8(b), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1958), is the
clearest indication of this policy.
1961]
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pands the union's right to self-help. Given this evidence, the Garner interpre-
tation seems untenable without explicit evidence that Congress intended to
occupy the field.
Although Briggs-Stratton may be good law today insofar as it authorizes
state regulation of concerted activity which is held by the NLRB to be neither
protected nor prohibited, the states' power to act in this area may be assaulted
from another quarter by the Garmon ruling that states cannot take jurisdiction
if the activity in question is "arguably subject" to sections 7 or 8. The "argu-
ably subject" test is a necessary adjunct of the institutional framework of
federal labor regulation. According to the Court in Garmon, Congress en-
trusted the interpretation and elaboration of its legislation to a centralized
agency, capable of developing an understanding of federal policies and an
expertness in unraveling the facts of complex labor disputes. 40 Decisions
delimiting the outer boundaries of sections 7 and 8, therefore, must be made in
the first instance by the NLRB. If those outer boundaries were dearly de-
fined, state courts and agencies would have no difficulty in assuming jurisdic-
tion over the "neither ... nor" activities which Briggs-Stratton allows them
to regulate. But whenever the applicability of sections 7 or 8 to a particular
activity is not clear, a state tribunal cannot take jurisdiction unless it first
interprets those sections to find that they do not apply-an act which would
impinge upon the primary interpretive function of the NLRB. Thus it is
necessary to prohibit regulation of activities "arguably subject" to the
NLRB's jurisdiction, at least until there is a "clear Board determination that
an activity is neither protected nor prohibited," 41 or until such a decision can
be based on "compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts."'42
The "arguably subject" test cuts deeply into the area left open to state
regulation by Briggs-Stratton. It is practically impossible to obtain a clear
NLRB determination that a particular activity is neither protected nor pro-
hibited without submitting the dispute in question to the Board's formal adju-
dicatory processes. The undefined status of the partial strike, perhaps the
most significant allegedly "neither ... nor" activity, illustrates this difficulty.
Although Briggs-Stratton held clearly that partial strikes were neither pro-
tected nor prohibited,43 that part of the holding was disowned by both the
majority and the concurrence in Garmon.44 In fact, the NLRB recently took
the position that partial strikes are a per se unfair labor practice in violation
of section 8(b) (3)'s duty to bargain in good faith.45 Although the Supreme
Court rejected the Board's position in NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l
40. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959).
41. Id. at 246.
42. Ibid.
43. International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
245,264-65 (1949).
44. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 n.4, 253 n.5 (1959).
45. Textile Workers Union (Personal Products Corp.), 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954),
enforcement denied in part, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 864 (1956).
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Union,40 the Court's opinion intimates that it was not returning to the
Briggs-Stratton view that partial strikes are categorically not prohibited.47
Rather, the status of such activity now seems to be a question to be determined
in each case. Partial strikes may also be prohibited as unfair labor practices
in other circumstances. Section 8(d) of Taft-Hartley makes it an unfair
labor practice to strike for the purpose of terminating or modifying an ex-
isting collective bargaining agreement, unless the union first gives the em-
ployer 60 days notice of the proposed termination or modification.48 Since
section 501(2) defines "strike" to include "any concerted slow down or other
concerted interruption of operations by employees," 49 a partial strike without
proper notice can violate 8(d). By the same reasoning, a partial strike may
also be prohibited by sections 8(b) (1) and 8(b) (4) when the union's pur-
pose is one proscribed by those sections.50 The section 7 status of partial
strikes is similarly unclear. In Insurance Agents the Court expressly left open
the question whether partial strikes were protected by section 7 ;51 it adhered
to the notion first expressed in Garmnon that Briggs-Stratton's answer to this
question, being a primary determination which should have been made by the
Board, was no longer authoritative.52 Resolution of this issue may be even
more difficult to obtain in a particular case than would the answer to a section
8 question. The structure of the statute is such as to allow the Board to
pass upon section 7 questions in only a few cases-those in which an employer
retaliates against the allegedly "protected" activity.53
Since the various forms of partial strike activity can cause serious damage
to the employer, often without affording the opportunity to take counter
46. 361 U.S. 477 (1960). In this case, the union, whose agents were attempting to
negotiate a new collective bargaining contract with the company, engaged in a series of
on-the-job activities designed to harass management. Among the union's tactics were
refusal to solicit new business, reporting late for work, engaging in "sit-in-mornings,"
picketing at specified times at the direction of the union, and soliciting policyholders'
signatures on petitions addressed to the company. The company filed a charge, and the
Board held the union's activities a refusal to bargain, under Labor Management Relations
Act § 8(b) (3), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1958), entering a cease-
and-desist order, 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957). The District of Columbia Circuit denied en-
forcement of the order, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
47. 361 U.S. at 493-94 n.23.
48. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1958).
49. Labor Management Relations Act § 501(2), 61 Stat. 161 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
142(2) (1958).
50. Labor Management Relations Act §§ 8(b) (1), 8(b) (4), 61 Stat. 141. (1947), 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (1), 158(b)(4) (1958).
51. 361 U.S. at 492 & n.22.
52. Id. at 493-94 n.23.
53. The sole way presently to obtain a Board hearing dealing with a right under § 7
is to bring an unfair labor practice charge against the employer, under §§ 8(a) (1) or
8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), 158(a) (3) (1958), or against the
union under § 8(b) (1), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (1958).
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measures or even to inflict the normal no-work-no-pay hardships of a strike,5 4
the states would seem to have a legitmate interest in regulating this activity.
But the necessity of first resorting to a formal NLRB proceeding to resolve
the "protected-prohibited" issue will probably sap the practical value of state
remedies. If the employer is petitioning the state court to enjoin a partial
strike, he cannot afford to wait more than a year 5 for the NLRB to determine
that the state court is not preempted. Instead, the employer will probably be
forced to capitulate during the delay."> While a damage remedy might be
available after the NLRB determination, suit on the stale claim, by disrupting
rehabilitated employee relations, may cost more than it is worth. If effective
state regulation of the "neither . . .nor" area is to be achieved, therefore, a
speedier procedure for obtaining NLRB adjudication must be devised.
This might be accomplished by establishing a procedure through which the
NLRB could render advisory opinons. Many administrative agencies utilize
such procedures to give informal guidance on such issues as: the application
of federal securities acts to certain business dealings ;57 duties on prospective
imports ;rs and the application of the tax laws to a wide range of transac-
54. The effect on production of the intermittent work stoppage, or "quickie" strike,
was described in International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 245, 249 (1949):
This procedure [e.g., the intermittent work stoppage] was publicly described by the
Union leaders as a new technique for bringing pressure upon the employer ....
[T]hese tactics ... did interfere with production and put strong economic pressure
upon the employer, who was disabled thereby from making any dependable pro-
duction plans or delivery commitments.
See Cox, supra note 38, at 339.
The "slowdown" is another effective means of applying economic pressure to an
employer. In International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. (Stolper
Steel), 258 Wis. 481, 46 N.W.2d 185 (1951), for example, the employees were able, while
retaining their positions, to cut production to 80% of its former level. Id. at 492, 46
N.W.2d at 190. Yet the employer in a "slowdown" situation is faced with the difficulty of
identifying the employees engaged in the activity; if he does not wish to discharge his
entire work force he may be left remediless, absent state regulation such as that of Stolper.
55. The time lapse between the filing of a charge and final Board decision in the average
contested case is 475 days. See REPORT OF THE ADViSORY PANEL ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS LAW TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, S. DOc. No.
81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., at pp. 1-2 (1960).
56. This appears to be the suggestion of Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Garmon:
Henceforth the States must withhold access to their courts until the National Labor
Relations Board has determined that such unprotected conduct is not an unfair
labor practice, a course which, because of unavoidable Board delays, may render
state redress ineffective.
359 U.S. at 253.
57. 17 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1949) ; see Blair-Smith, Forms of Administrative Interpreta-
tion Under the Securities Laws, 26 IOWA L. REv. 241 (1941).
58. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATION OF
THE CUSTOMS LAWS 89-91 (1941).
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tions."9 Indeed, pursuant to section 701 of the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959,60
which permits state regulation if the Board finds that the effect of the labor
dispute on commerce is not "sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise
of its jurisdiction," parties in state courts or agencies may, upon filing com-
merce data with the NLRB, secure an advisory opinion on whether the Board
would assert jurisdiction over the case."' While the Board's power to deny
jurisdiction on these grounds is explicitly granted by the new statute (al-
though the power is probably inherent) ,62 the advisory opinion procedure itself
is fashioned under the Board's general authority to promulgate rules and
regulations under section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act.63 Thus
section 6 appears to be sufficient authority to enable the Board to issue ad-
visory opinions about jurisdictional matters which could be decided in actual
cases before it. It might, therefore, authorize an advisory opinion procedure
by which the NLRB could resolve questions of its substantive jurisdicion
under sections 7 and 8.
Such opinions would not in every case be a determination on the merits, but
only an initial determination of jurisdiction. The advisory ruling that certain
conduct is within the NLRB's jurisdiction because it is "protected" or "pro-
hibited" could be given the significance of a complaint issued by a regional
director. No formal order would issue without invocation of the Board's
normal unfair labor practice procedures. After a full hearing on the merits,
the trial examiner or the Board would remain free to decide the case on its
record. Admittedly, to the extent that a final decision might contradict an
advisory opinion, and hold that that the activity was in fact "unprotected" all
the while, the advisory opinion procedure would not advance the litigant very
far in his search for effective relief. But the advantages of this procedure are
to be found elsewhere. If the advisory opinion should characterize the activity in
question as neither protected nor prohibited the ruling would be dispositive;
it would then be tantamount to a refusal by the General Counsel to issue a com-
plaint in an unfair labor practice case-the end of the matter as far as the
NLRB is concerned. 64 In these cases, state courts or agencies will be given
jurisdiction over labor disputes which otherwise would fall into the "no law
land" created by Garmon and its "arguably subject" test.
59. See BiTTKER, FEDERAL INcOmE ESTATE AND GiFt TAXATION 28-29 (1958).
60. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)
(Supp. I, 1959).
61. 29 C.F.R. § 102.98 (Supp. 1960).
62. The Supreme Court appears to have recognized such a power in NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951):
Even when the effect of activities on interstate commerce is sufficient to" enable the
Board to take jurisdiction of a complaint, the Board sometimes properly declines to
do so, stating that the policies of the Act would not be effectuated by its assertion of
jurisdiction in that case.
63. National Labor Relations Act § 6, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1958).
64. See notes 66-69 infra, and accompanying text.
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The obvious objection to such advisory opinions is that the summary pro-
cedure necessary for their speedy issuance is not appropriate for deciding
the complex factual and legal questions often presented by disputes involving
sections 7 and 8. Indeed, the complexity of labor problems and the Board's
unique ability to deal with them is one of the basic reasons advanced for
protecting the Board's primary jurisdiction. 65 It might seem ironic to insist
upon referring a problem to the Board, and then to provide that only a small
portion of the Board's expert machinery will be brought to bear upon it.
Yet this is in fact what often happens in the Board's normal adjudicatory
processes. The initial determination on the merits of any unfair labor practice
charge is made, not by the Board members or a Trial Examiner, but by a
Regional Director acting as an agent of the General Counsel. The Taft-
Hartley act separates the prosecutory and adjudicatory functions of the
NLRB, placing the former under the exclusive control of the General Coun-
sel.8 6 When an unfair labor practice charge is filed and the respondent has
answered the charge, a field examiner from the regional office makes an in-
formal investigation of the alleged facts of the dispute.6 7 On the basis of this
investigation, the Regional Director can refuse to issue a complaint if he finds
that there is insufficient evidence of the facts alleged, or that the facts as alleged
do not constitute a violation of the act.68 This decision may be appealed with-
in ten days to the General Counsel, whose decision is final. 9 Although the
independent authority of the General Counsel in issuing complaints has fre-
quently been criticized, 70 it has survived one attempt at repeal 71 and must be
regarded as an essential feature of NLRB procedure.
65. The Board can develop the sort of expertise as a factfinder which the courts,
because they may not confine their business to a single field, may not.
[Congress] went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules
to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure
for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial
relief pending a final administrative order.
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
66. Labor Management Relations Act § 3(d), 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 153(d) (1958).
67. 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (Supp. 1960).
68. 29 C.F.R. § 101.5 (Supp. 1960).
69. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.6, 102.19 (Supp. 1960).
70. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXEcUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
TASic FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 139-41 (1949); Hearings on H. Res.
512 and H. Res. 516 Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 107 (1950).
71. Reorganization Plan 12 of 1950, H.R. Doc- No. 516, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950),
was an attempt by the President to transfer certain functions of the General Counsel to
the Chairman of the NLRB. It was opposed by the late Senator Taft because it was, inter
alia, an attempt "to reverse by Executive action a basic matter of policy determined by
Congress 3 years ago." Hearings on H. Res. 512 and H. Res. 516 Before the Committee on
Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1950). Senator Taft
himself had previously proposed that the Board return to its pre-1947 structure. See S.
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NLRB ADVISORY OPINIONS
Adaptation of this procedure to provide a mechanism for advisory opinions
would not necessarily lower the quality of the NLRB's interpretive or fact-
finding processes. Not every problem raised under Garmon is likely to conjure
up new mysteries of federal labor law. The status of many activities "argu-
ably subject" to the act would probably be considered a routine question by
a Regional Director who, unlike a state court or agency, deals with such
problems daily. When difficult or unsettled issues of law are presented, the
Regional Director could follow the current practice of certifying those
questions to the General Counsel's office before disposing of an unfair labor
practice charge.7 2 Moreover, on close questions of law or fact, the General
Counsel will probably allow some latitude in favor of preserving the Board's
jurisdiction, preferring to postpone the agency's final answer to such ques-
tions until after a full hearing and review by the Board members. Errors
made in this direction will be harmless, since their only effect will be to oust
the state court of jurisdiction-a result no worse than that which presently
obtains under the "arguably subject" test. 3 But in that area where the facts
can readily be determined and where the Regional Director or the General
Counsel feels competent to interpret the law, the vagaries of the "arguably
subject" test can be avoided by a relatively swift decision on the applicability
of sections 7 and 8.
The Court in Garmnon warned that it would not accept the General Coun-
sel's refusal to assert jurisdiction as a clear NLRB ruling that certain conduct
was neither protected nor prohibited.74 A refusal to assert jurisdiction, the
Court noted, need not be based on a substantive ground; the NLRB may
also choose not to act when the impact of the dispute on commerce is insig-
nificant, or when in his discretion the General Counsel does not believe that
the policy of the act would be served by prosecuting the respondent. 5 This
objection has in large part been obviated by the 1959 amendment which
permits states to regulate when NLRB jurisdiction is refused for insufficient
impact on commerce.7 ° It remains valid, however, insofar as the complaint
may be denied on the basis of some undefined exercise of discretion. More
important, the denial of a complaint is usually not a complete definition of
the activity's status. A finding that activity X is not an unfair labor practice does
not, without more, answer the question of whether activity X is protected
REP. No. 99, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1949); 95 Coxc. REc. 5589, 8506, 8712, 8808
(1949). And in 1960, the REPORT OF TnE ADVISORY PANEL, op. cit. supra note 55, recom-
mended abandonment of what it called "the present hybrid compromise." S. Doc. No. 81,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1960). For a brief discussion of these various proposals, see
generally GELLHORN & BYsE, CAsEs ox ADMnNisTRArmv LAW 1024-28 (4th ed. 1960).
72. 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (Supp. 1960).
73. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
74. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1959).
75. Ibid.
76. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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by section 7.77 But neither of these objections to the "legal significance" of
a denied complaint would apply to an advisory opinion. All that is required
is a clear formulation of the question to be answered by the advisory
opinion: "Is this activity prohibited by section 8 or protected by section 7?"
The question is within the Regional Director's competence, for it only asks
him to articulate conclusions which he often makes in judging the merits
of an unfair labor practice charge.
77. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
